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Stock Redemptions and the Family-Owned 
Corporation: Tax Traps on the Path to Capital 
Gain Treatment 
Scott E. Copple* 
The recent enactment of the new capital gains exclusion1 has 
raised the stakes in planning for the redemption of corporate 
stock. This article discusses the tax problems confronting a 
shareholder in a family-owned corporation when the 
shareholder enters into an agreement for the redemption of his 
or her stock. 
In a transaction involving the redemption of corporate 
stock, whether a shareholder is treated as the recipient of a 
dividend distribution or the seller of stock has important 
federal income tax ramifications. If the redemption is treated 
as a dividend, the distribution to the shareholder is taxed as 
ordinary income. On the other hand, if the redemption is 
treated as a sale, the shareholder recognizes a capital gain 
based on the excess of the amount of the distribution over the 
basis in the stock redeemed. Assuming a taxpayer receives a 
distribution of $1,000,000 in exchange for his or her stock, the 
taxpayer could pay an additional $256,000 in federal income 
tax if the transaction is treated as a dividend di~tribution.~ 
* Assistant Professor of Accountancy, College of Business Administration, 
University of Nebraska a t  Omaha. J.D., College of William and Mary's Marshall- 
Wythe School of Law; LL.M., Denver University College of Law; C.P.A. (inactive). 
The author was employed as a tax manager by Grant Thornton, CPAs, primarily 
in the areas of tax planning and I.R.S. appeals. He currently teaches 
undergraduate and graduate tax courses a t  the University of Nebraska a t  Omaha. 
1. I.R.C. $ 1202 (1988). 
2. A shareholder in the 39.6% marginal tax bracket would pay $396,000 in 
federal income tax on the distribution if it  were taxed as a dividend. See id. 
$ l(a). Assuming the redemption were treated as a sale and that the gain qualified 
for the partial exclusion under I.R.C. 9 1202, only $500,000 of the gain (assuming 
no basis in the stock) would be taxed a t  a rate of 28%, resulting in a federal 
income tax liability of $140,000 on the redemption. See id. $0 l(h), 1202. The 
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The adverse tax consequences associated with a failed 
stock redemption require careful planning on the part of a 
shareholder in a family-owned corporation. A shareholder in a 
family-owned corporation may confront several problems in 
achieving capital gain treatment on the redemption of his or 
her stock. For example, if the corporation's stock is held in 
trust for the benefit of family members, the redemption may be 
recast as a dividend distribution. In addition, a shareholder 
who provides postredemption services to the corporation may 
jeopardize the sale treatment that would otherwise characterize 
the transaction. Finally, if the redeemed shareholder, in an 
effort to accommodate the corporation's need for additional 
financing, allows an installment note received in the 
redemption to be subordinated to the claims of other corporate 
creditors, the Internal Revenue Service ("the Service") may 
attempt to recast the sale as a dividend distribution. 
This paper examines case law and administrative 
interpretations in an effort to demonstrate the extent to which 
a shareholder may, through proper tax planning, avoid these 
problems. In  addition, whether these judicial and 
administrative interpretations support the policies underlying 
the rules surrounding stock redemptions in the case of family- 
owned corporations is examined. 
The tax consequences to a shareholder receiving a 
nonliquidating distribution from his or her subchapter C 
corporation are governed primarily by $8 301 and 302.~ Under 
8 301, a shareholder recognizes ordinary income upon the 
receipt of a distribution from his or her corporation to the 
extent of the shareholder's share of the corporation's earnings 
and profits.* On the other hand, if a shareholder's stock is 
redeemed by the corporation and the transaction meets the 
requirements found in 5 302, the distribution by the 
corporation is treated as an amount realized on the sale of 
stock by the ~hareholder.~ The shareholder recognizes capital 
characterization of redistribution as a dividend would almost certainly result in an 
even larger tax differential since the shareholder's gain would be reduced by the 
tax basis in the stock redeemed. 
3. Id. $0 301, 302. 
4. See id. §§ 301(c), 316(a). 
5. Id. $ 302(a). 
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gain or loss based on the difference between the amount 
realized and the adjusted basis of the stock redeemed? 
Prior to the enactment of $ 302, the courts determined the 
tax consequences of a corporate redemption by examining the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the distribution.' If the 
facts and circumstances indicated a distribution was essentially 
equivalent to a dividend, the shareholder was treated as 
though a dividend distribution had been made, even though the 
shareholder actually surrendered stock to the ~orporation.~ 
In enacting 5 302, Congress sought to provide certainty so 
that shareholders in closely held corporations would know the 
tax treatment for a distribution pursuant to a proposed 
redemption transa~tion.~ Although the "dividend equivalence" 
test of prior law found its way into $ 302," three mechanical 
tests were also enacted to provide the certainty Congress 
intended for shareholders planning stock redemption 
transactions." Two of the mechanical tests found in $ 302 
deal with determining the degree of change in the shareholder's 
ownership in the redeeming corporation. Under 5 302(b)(2), a 
shareholder will receive sale treatment for a redemption 
transaction, if after the redemption the shareholder owns less 
than 50% of the voting power of the corporation and if his 
percentage ownership in the outstanding voting stock (as well 
as all common stock) is reduced by more than 20%.12 Such a 
redemption is referred to as a "substantially disproportionate 
redemption."13 Under 5 302(b)(3), a shareholder will receive 
sale treatment if all the stock owned by the shareholder is 
redeemed by the corporation." Such a redemption is referred 
to as a "complete redemption."15 
- -  - 
6. Id. $ 1001(a). 
7 .  See, e.g., Bains v. United States, 289 F.2d 644, 646 (Ct. C1. 1961). 
8. Id. at 647. 
9. H.R. REP. NO. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1954), reprinted in 1954 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4019, 4060-61; S. REP. NO. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 233 (1954), 
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4623, 4675. 
10. I.R.C. $ 302(b)(l). 
11. Id. $ 302(b)(2)-(4). 
12. Id. $ 302(b)(2). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. $ 302(b)(3). The third mechanical test deals with a redemption of 
stock pursuant to a partial liquidation of the corporation and is not relevant to the 
issues addressed in this paper. See id. $ 302(b)(4). 
15. Id. 
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The stock attribution rules of $ 318 are made applicable to 
redemption transactions of 8 302.16 Without the application of 
these stock attribution rules, a shareholder seeking to receive a 
distribution from his or her corporation could transfer stock to 
a related party, such as a spouse or a wholly owned 
corporation, and after the transfer enter into a redemption 
transaction meeting the requirements of $ 302(b)(2) or (b)(3). 
Under the stock attribution rules of 5 318, a shareholder is 
treated as the owner of stock actually owned by certain related 
parties for purposes of determining if there has been, in 
substance as well as in form, a substantially disproportionate 
distribution or a complete redemption.17 
In general, for purposes of the redemption tests in 5 302, 
the family stock attribution rules applicable to stock 
redemptions provide that stock owned by certain family 
members is attributed to the shareholder whose stock is 
redeemed? Application of the family attribution rules makes 
it extremely difficult for a shareholder in a family-owned 
corporation to receive sale treatment on a redemption of stock. 
After the redemption, the shareholder is treated as owning any 
stock held by family members. Even bona fide redemptions 
flunk the tests of 5 302 since all stock owned by family 
members after the redemption are treated as the shareholder's 
stock, thus precluding a substantially disproportionate 
distribution and a complete redemption. 
Congress intended to allow a family member engaging in a 
bona fide stock redemption to receive capital gain treatment.lg 
Consequently, 8 302(c)(2) provides an exception to the 
application of the family stock attribution rules.20 A taxpayer 
16. Id. 8 302(c)(l). 
17. Id. 8 318. 
18. Id. 
19. H.R. REP. NO. 1337, supra note 9, a t  36, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
a t  4061; S. REP. NO. 1622, supra note 9, a t  45, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. a t  
4676. 
20. I.R.C. 4 302(c)(2). Section 302(c)(2)(A) provides in part: 
(A) In the case of a distribution described in subsection (b)(3), section 
318(a)(l) shall not apply if- 
(i) immediately after the distribution the distributee has no interest in 
the corporation (including an interest as officer, director, or employee), 
other than an interest as a creditor, 
(ii) the distributee does not acquire any such interest (other than 
stock acquired by bequest or inheritance) within 10 years from the date 
of such distribution, and 
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who enters into a redemption agreement with his or her family- 
owned corporation can be assured of sale treatment as long as 
all the stock of the corporation held by the taxpayer is 
redeemed; there are no related parties, as set forth in 8 318, 
other than family members who own stock in the corporation; 
and the taxpayer has no interest in the corporation for a ten- 
year period after the redemption.21 It is the application of the 
stock attribution rules, and the conditions that must be met in 
order to waive the family stock attribution rules, that create 
the problems confronting a shareholder of a family-owned 
corporation who seeks sale treatment on the redemption of his 
or her stock. 
A. The Problem with Stock Held in Trust 
Stock in a family-owned corporation may be owned by 
several family members. In addition, corporate stock may be 
held by a testamentary trust as a result of the death of a 
shareholder whose assets pass to a marital or nonmarital trust 
pursuant to prudent estate planning. In most cases, the testa- 
mentary trust provides income to the surviving spouse andlor 
younger family members. The trust principal may be distribut- 
able to younger family members upon the death of the surviv- 
ing spouse or the trust may give to the surviving spouse a 
power of appointment over the trust p r i n ~ i p a l . ~ ~  In addition, 
depending on the estate planning objectives of the decedent, 
the trustee may be given the power to make discretionary dis- 
tributions to the surviving spouse or younger family members. 
Younger family members may have divergent business 
philosophies. Some family members may work for the corpora- 
tion while others show little interest in the corporation's af- 
fairs. Family members may simply not get along. For whatever 
reason, one or more shareholders may seek to terminate their 
(iii) the distributee, at such time and in such manner as the 
Secretary by regulations prescribes, files an agreement to notify the 
Secretary of any acquisition described in clause (ii) and to retain such 
records as may be necessary for the application of this paragraph. 
21. Id. 5 302(c)(2). It is only the family stock attribution rules that can be 
waived under I.R.C. 5 302(c)(2). 
22. See id. 4 2056(b)(5), (7). 
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interest in the corporation and invest their stock redemption 
proceeds elsewhere. 
The use of trusts to hold stock in a family-owned corpora- 
tion can create a problem if a family member who is a trust 
beneficiary decides to terminate his or her interest in the cor- 
poration pursuant to a stock redemption transaction. The re- 
deemed shareholder may be treated as a continuing sharehold- 
er due to his or her beneficial interest in the trust, no matter 
how remote the beneficial interest.23 This deemed continuing 
ownership interest in the redeeming corporation may cause the 
redemption to be recast, for federal income tax purposes, as a 
dividend distribution. 
B. The Application of the Stock Attribution Rules 
Originally, some confusion existed over exactly who might 
waive the family stock attribution rules in redemption transac- 
tions. The Service took the position that only individual taxpay- 
ers could waive these rules.24 This position prevented a trust 
from achieving capital gain treatment on a stock redemption 
when its beneficiaries were related to other shareholders in 
such a way that the shareholders' interests were attributed to 
the trust beneficiaries. For example, if a surviving spouse was 
the beneficiary of a testamentary trust, and the trust received 
a distribution from the corporation in exchange for all the cor- 
porate stock held by the trust, the Service treated the distribu- 
tion to the trust as a dividend if children of the surviving 
spouse also owned stock in the corporation. Fortunately for 
taxpayers, the courts did not necessarily agree with the Ser- 
vice. 
In Crawford u. Cornrni~sioner,~~ the Tax Court held that a 
trust could utilize the 5 302(c)(2) family stock attribution waiv- 
er and treat the redemption of all the trust's stock as a com- 
plete termination under 5 302(b)(3). Capital gain treatment 
was allowed even though the trust beneficiary was related to 
other shareholders under the family stock attribution rule of 
5 318(a)(l). Other courts held for trusts on facts similar to 
those of C r ~ w f o r d . ~ ~  The holding in Crawford was later codi- 
23. Id. 5 318(a)(2)(B). 
24. Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 C.B. 106. 
25. 59 T.C. 830 (1973). 
26. See, e.g., Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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fied in 1982 as part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
The waiver of the family stock attribution rule made avail- 
able to trusts under $ 302(c)(2)(C) allows a trust to treat a re- 
demption of stock as a sale but does not address the problem 
an individual taxpayer may face when he or she seeks capital 
gain treatment on the redemption of all his or her stock. If the 
shareholder is also a beneficiary of a trust, the shareholder will 
be deemed to own stock held by the This deemed stock 
ownership will likely cause the redemption to be treated as a 
dividend distribution. 
To illustrate, suppose a deceased shareholder, under the 
terms of his or her will, transfers stock in a family-owned cor- 
poration to a trust. The trust provides that income is to be 
distributed to the surviving spouse. The trustee is given the 
power to make discretionary distributions of trust income or 
corpus to the surviving spouse or to the children of the dece- 
dent. The surviving spouse is given a special power of appoint- 
ment over the trust corpus. Absent an exercise of the power of 
appointment, upon the death of the surviving spouse the trust 
corpus is to be distributed to the three children, A, B, and C, of 
the deceased shareholder and the surviving spouse. The re- 
27. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 228(a), 96 Stat. 324, 493 (1982). I.R.C. 
$ 302(c)(2)(C) provides: 
(i) In general.-[The waiver of the family stock attribution rule (sub- 
paragraph (A))] shall not apply to a distribution to any entity unless- 
(I) such entity and each related person meet the requirements of 
clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) of subparagraph (A), and 
(11) each related person agrees to be jointly and severally liable for 
any deficiency (including interest and additions to tax) resulting from an 
acquisition described in clause (ii) of subparagraph (A). 
In any case to which the preceding sentence applies, the second sentence 
of subparagraph (A) and subparagraph (B)(ii) shall be applied by substi- 
tuting "distributee or any related person" for "distributeen each place it 
appears. 
(ii) Definitions.-For purposes of this subparagraph- 
(I) the term "entityn means a partnership, estate, trust, or corpora- 
tion; and 
(11) the term "related person" means any person to whom owner- 
ship of stock in the corporation is (at the time of the distribution) attrib- 
utable under section 318(a)(l) if such stock is further attributable to the 
entity under section 318(a)(3). 
28. I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(B). Section 302(c)(2)(C) addresses the waiver of family 
attribution when a trust's stock is redeemed, not the waiver of the trust-beneficiary 
attribution rules. 
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maining stock in the corporation is owned by the surviving 
spouse and the three children. The surviving spouse alone, 
through direct stock ownership and through the stock attribut- 
ed to her through her beneficial interest in the trust, owns or is 
deemed to own more than 50% of the total outstanding stock. 
In addition, suppose that acrimony develops after the 
shareholder's death, largely due to the fact that A and B, who 
are not active in the affairs of the corporation, distrust C, who 
is the corporation's president. To resolve the conflict, the family 
proposes that A and B sell their stock to the corporation and 
invest the sale proceeds elsewhere. 
Unless the redemption qualifies as a complete termination 
under 5 302(b)(3), the redeemed shareholders, A and B, must 
treat the amounts received as dividend income. Since the re- 
deemed shareholders are treated as owning the surviving 
spouse's stock in all cases other than a complete termination, 
each would be deemed to own more than 50% of the 
corporation's outstanding stock.29 This deemed stock owner- 
ship would cause their redemption to fail the disproportionate 
distribution test under 5 302(b)(2) and almost certainly the 
dividend equivalency test under 8 302(b)(l), which requires a 
showing that the distribution was not essentially equivalent to 
a dividend. 
Assuming each redeemed shareholder makes an election 
under 8 302(c)(2)(A)(iii) and files the necessary information 
with the Service, however, the stock of the surviving spouse 
will not be attributed to them.30 Their sibling's, C's, stock will 
not be attributed to them either since brothers and sisters are 
not considered related parties.31 Further, the stock held by the 
trust and attributed to the surviving spouse will not be attrib- 
uted through the surviving spouse to the children since the 
family stock attribution waiver applies to the stock attributable 
to the spouse through the However, there is no specif- 
ic statutory provision preventing the stock held by the trust 
from being attributed to the children as trust beneficiaries 
under 5 318(a)(2)(B)(i).~~ Will the redeemed shareholder's con- 
29. Id. § 318(a)(l). 
30. Id. 5 302(c)(2). 
31. Id. 5 318(a)(l). 
32. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-12-032 (Dec. 21, 1977). 
33. Only the family stock attribution rules are waived under I.R.C. 
9 302(c)(2). The other stock attribution rules of 5 318 apply in determining whether 
a redeemed shareholder has terminated his or her interest in the corporation un- 
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tingent remainder interests therefore cause the redemption to 
be treated as a dividend distribution? 
The statutory language offers little hope to the redeemed 
shareholder. Section 318(a)(2)(B)(i) provides that beneficiaries 
of a trust are treated as owning stock held by the trust in an 
amount relative to their actuarial interest in the Sec- 
tion 318(a)(3)(B)(i), which states that stock owned by a trust 
beneficiary will be attributed to the trust, also provides that no 
attribution to the trust is made if the beneficiary holds only a 
remote, contingent interest  in  the Section 
318(a)(2)(B)(i) does not provide a similar exclusion for remote, 
contingent interests in the case of trust-to-beneficiary attribu- 
tion. No court decisions have dealt specifically with the ques- 
tion of whether a de minimis rule similar to that found in 
8 318(a)(3)(B)(i) should be read into § 318(a)(2)(B)(i). Treasury 
regulations do not address the issue either. However, the Ser- 
vice has addressed the issue, albeit not in the context of a stock 
redemption. Revenue Procedure 77-37,36 which sets forth oper- 
ating rules relating to the issuance of letter rulings, provides 
guidelines for taxpayers requesting a ruling regarding corpo- 
rate reorganizations. Section 3.05 of Revenue Procedure 77-37 
states: 
In determining stock ownership to be attributed to a 
trust or from a trust under the rules of sections 318(a)(2)(B)(i) 
and 313(a)(3)(B)(i) of the Code in those cases where a surviv- 
ing spouse is entitled to all the income for life from the trust 
and also holds a power of appointment over the corpus of the 
trust, and in default of the exercise of the power the property 
held by the trust is to pass to the children of the surviving 
spouse, attribution will be -computed as if the surviving 
spouse has exercised the power in favor of his or her children, 
so that they will be considered beneficiaries in the absence of 
evidence that the power has been differently exercised. 
der 6 302(b)(3). See supra note 21. 
34. I.R.C. 6 318(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that stock held by a trust will be attrib- 
uted to a taxpayer who is considered the owner of the trust under the grantor 
trust rules in I.R.C. $0 671-679 (1988). Therefore, if the surviving spouse is given 
a general power of appointment over the trust corpus, and is treated as the owner 
of the trust property under I.R.C. 6 678, then the stock held by the trust would be 
treated as owned by the surviving spouse and the waiver of the family attribution 
rules would apply to the stock held by the trust. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-35-038 
(June 1, 1990). 
35. I.R.C. 6 318(a)(3)(B)(i). 
36. 1977-2 C.B. 568. 
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It appears, from section 3.05, that the Service will treat a 
contingent trust beneficiary as the owner of his or her propor- 
tionate share of the stock held by the trust. Without a relax- 
ation of the application of the trust-to-beneficiary stock attribu- 
tion rule, even a remote, contingent remainderman will not be 
able to treat the redemption of his or her stock as a complete 
termination. A and B in the example set forth above would 
thus be required to treat the amount received for their stock as 
dividend distributions. 
This is a harsh result for the redeeming shareholder. As a 
remote, contingent remainderman of the trust, the shareholder 
has no control over the stock held in trust. If another (the sur- 
viving spouse in the example set forth above) has a power of 
appointment over the trust property, the shareholder may 
never receive his or her remainder interest. As a practical mat- 
ter, such a shareholder has no more an interest in the stock 
held in trust than the same shareholder has in stock held out- 
right by a related party whose will provides for the transfer of 
such stock to the shareholder. 
The position taken in Revenue Procedure 77-37 is particu- 
larly harsh when one considers that after a complete redemp- 
tion of a shareholder's stock, the shareholder is allowed to 
inherit stock from a decedent without affecting the character- 
ization of the prior distribution as a redemption transa~tion.~? 
That same shareholder would be denied sale treatment if, prior 
to the related shareholder's death, the related shareholder held 
a special power of appointment over stock held in trust and if a 
redeeming shareholder possessed at the time of the stock re- 
demption only a remote, contingent interest in the trust. Con- 
gress should consider amending § 318(a)(2)(B)(i), at  least as it 
applies to stock redemptions, to include a de minimis rule simi- 
lar to the rule provided in 5 318(a)(3)(B)(i) to prevent stock 
attribution to remote, contingent beneficiaries. 
C. Possible Solutions to the Problem 
Absent congressional action, a shareholder could renounce 
his or her interest in the trust and thereby avoid the trust to 
beneficiary stock attribution rule.38 However, this may be an 
impractical and expensive alternative. First, the shareholder 
37. I.R.C. 9 302(c)(2)(B). 
38. Rev. Rul. 71-211, 1971-1 C.B. 112. 
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may be treated as making a gift subject to federal gift tax upon 
ren~nciation.~' Second, the taxpayer may be denied the oppor- 
tunity to share in the estate of his or her parents, since the 
trust assets will ultimately be distributed to the remaining 
trust beneficiaries. Finally, the renouncing sharehold- 
erheneficiary may see trust property go to the very family 
member who is the cause of his or her desire to enter into the 
stock redemption agreement in the first place. He or she may 
be forced to remain a disgruntled shareholder to avoid such a 
distasteful result. 
The trust to beneficiary attribution rule could also be 
avoided if the surviving spouse exercised his or her power of 
appointment and directed the trust to make a distribution to 
the redeeming shareholder in an amount equal to the intended 
disposition of the trust property upon the death of the surviv- 
ing spouse. The redeemed shareholder could then renounce his 
or her interest in the trust, having received his or her "share" 
of trust property, and thereby attain sale treatment on the 
redemption. However, the surviving spouse may be unwilling to 
authorize such a distribution due to concern over the loss of 
control over the property to be distributed. The surviving 
spouse may be reluctant to do anything that might alter the 
intent of the deceased spouse regarding when and to whom his 
or her assets should ultimately be distributed. 
Perhaps the most palatable solution to the problem caused 
by the trust-to-beneficiary stock attribution rule would be to 
distribute the stock held by the trust to the surviving spouse. 
Such a distribution would not create adverse tax consequences 
for the surviving spouse or the trust and would result in stock 
being held only by family members. In the example set forth 
above the trustee could exercise his or her power to distribute 
the stock from the trust to the surviving spouse. Additionally, 
the surviving spouse could transfer all the stock received to a 
newly created trust in which A and B had no interest. A and B 
would receive sale treatment on the redemption since the fami- 
ly stock attribution waiver provision would allow the redemp- 
tion to qualify as a complete termination under 5 302(b)(3). 
This solution presupposes the ability to transfer the stock 
held in trust to trust beneficiaries. The power to transfer may 
be held by the surviving spouse as a power of appointment over 
-- - 
39. I.R.C. 5 2503. 
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the trust property or by the trustee as a power to distribute 
trust property to trust beneficiaries. The power need not be 
plenary. The terms of the trust may give the surviving spouse 
the right to income only and prevent the trustee from making 
discretionary distributions of trust property. Without the power 
to distribute the stock held by the trust, the redeeming share- 
holder will face the hard choice between renouncing his or her 
interest in the trust and risking dividend treatment on the 
redemption transaction. 
D. Summary 
Closely held business owners and their tax advisors should 
exercise caution in planning for the disposition of stock in a 
family-owned corporation. Placing the stock of a family-owned 
corporation in trust is a dangerous proposition when no provi- 
sion is made for the distribution of such stock. Family hostility 
may erupt after the death of the first spouse and could cause 
the corporation to suffer, as feuding shareholders, unwilling to 
renounce and incur distribution tax treatment, fail to focus on 
the operation of the corporation's business. 
IV. POST-REDEMPTION SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE REDEEMED 
SHAREHOLDER 
The retiring shareholder of a closely held corporation may 
have a particular expertise that was gained through formal 
education or through years of experience in the corporation's 
business. Perhaps the retiring shareholder holds a professional 
degree in accounting or law and has developed a special exper- 
tise in some aspect of his or her profession relating to the busi- 
ness of the corporation. Or perhaps the retiring shareholder is 
an engineer with a special expertise related to the products 
developed and sold by the corporation. 
Younger family members may want to retain the retiring 
shareholder for the expertise he or she has developed. To that 
end the corporation and the redeemed shareholder may enter 
into an employment or consulting contract, or the corporation 
may engage the redeemed shareholder from time to time after 
the redemption to provide consulting services to the corpora- 
tion. Will such an agreement for postredemption s e ~ c e s  be 
considered a prohibited "interest" in the corporation under 
5 302(c)(2)(A) and therefore cause the family attribution rules 
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to apply in determining whether the taxpayer was completely 
redeemed? 
A. Analysis of Primary Authority 
In Lewis v. Cornmis~ioner,'~ the taxpayer received a dis- 
tribution from his family-owned corporation in exchange for all 
his stock in the corporation. The taxpayer, who formed the 
corporation to operate his retail automobile dealership, initially 
owned all the stock but had transferred stock to his sons over a 
period of years so that at  the date of redemption he owned 495 
of the 1,000 shares ~utstanding.~' Although the taxpayer did 
not work for the corporation after the redemption, he did hold 
the title of vice president and was an inactive member of the 
board of dire~tors.'~ 
The Tax Court majority held that the redemption transac- 
tion was not essentially equivalent to a dividend and therefore 
qualified for sale or exchange treatment under 5 302(b)(1).'~ 
One might question the holding of the Tax Court given the f a d  
that had the stock attribution rules been applied, the taxpayer 
would have been treated as owning 100% of the corporation's 
stock." However, the significance of Lewis is not in its holding 
but rather in its concurring opinion, which discusses applica- 
tion of the waiver of the family attribution rules provided by 
5 302(c)(2) to the facts of the case.45 
The concurring opinion concluded that the taxpayer met 
the requirements of $ 302(c)(2), including the prohibition 
against having a prohibited interest in the corporation, despite 
the fact that the taxpayer held the positions of vice president 
and member of the board of directors: 
The purpose of section 302(c)(2) is to provide that when there 
is a bona fide severance of the shareholder's interest, he will 
receive capital gains treatment. On the other hand, although 
there is no direct judicial authority or statement in the legis- 
lative history of section 302(c)(2), I believe that Congress did 
not intend us to hold that an officer or director who performs 
no duties, receives no compensation, and exercises no influ- 
40. 47 T.C. 129 (1966). 
41. Id. at 130. 
42. Id. at 131. 
43. Id. at 135. 
44. See id.; I.R.C. 8 318. 
45. 47 T.C. at 136 (Simpson, J., concurring). 
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ence has retained an interest in the corporation. It is a fair 
inference from the section as a whole and from its legislative 
history that Congress was concerned with the situation in 
which there was a nominal transfer of stock in a family corpo- 
ration, although the transferor continued to control the cor- 
poration and benefit by its operations. . . . Finally, I believe 
that form should not be placed above substance, that in sub- 
stance this petitioner did not retain an interest in the corpo- 
ration, and that accordingly he has met the condition of sec- 
tion 302(c)(2)(A)(i).*~ 
In short, the concurrence concluded that the parenthetical 
language in 5 302(c)(2)(A)(i) does not prohibit every officer or 
director from waiving the family attribution rules. While a 
retained interest may include an interest as an officer or di- 
rector, every officer or director does not necessarily hold an 
interest in the c~rporat ion.~~ Whether an officer or director re- 
tains an interest in the corporation should be determined by 
examining the substance, rather than the form, of the relation- 
ship between the redeemed shareholder and the redeeming 
corp~rat ion.~~ 
The Tax Court first addressed the issue of whether a con- 
sulting agreement constitutes an interest in the corporation 
under 5 302(c)(2)(A)(i) in Lennard v. Cornrnis~ioner.~~ In 
Lennard, the taxpayer's one-third interest in a corporation 
originally formed by his son and an unrelated third party was 
redeemed, and the taxpayer simultaneously resigned his posi- 
tions as director and secretary-trea~urer.~' The taxpayer, a 
C.P.A., continued to perform accounting services for the corpo- 
ration, for which he was compensated as an independent con- 
tractor.51 There was no continuing consulting contract be- 
tween the corporation and the taxpayer. After the redemption, 
and a subsequent stock acquisition, the taxpayer's son owned 
two-thirds of the stock in the corporation. 
The Service argued that due to the consulting services 
performed for the corporation, the taxpayer had an interest in 
the corporation after the stock redemption and sought to char- 
46. Id. at 137-38 (footnotes omitted). 
47. Id. at 137. 
48. Id. at 138. 
49. 61 T.C. 554 (1974). 
50. Id. at 555, 557. 
51. Id. at 557. 
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acterize the amount received from the corporation as a divi- 
dend.52 The Service cited Revenue Ruling 70-104~~ in support 
of its position.54 In Revenue Ruling 70-104, a father, who with 
his children owned a corporation engaged in the retail jewelry 
business, entered into an agreement with the corporation for 
the redemption of all his stock. In addition, the corporation and 
the father entered into a five-year consulting agreement by 
which the father would provide consulting services to the corpo- 
ration.55 The Service held that the consulting agreement con- 
stituted an "interest in the corporation" under § 302(c)(2)(A)(i) 
so that the waiver of the family stock attribution rules was not 
available to the father? His stock redemption was therefore 
treated as a dividend.57 
The Tax Court rejected the argument made by the Service. 
While recognizing that the revenue ruling represented the 
position of the Service, the court distinguished the facts of the 
case from the facts presented in the ruling: 
Even if the revenue ruling were controlling, which it is 
not, we think the facts of this case are different. [The taxpay- 
er] performed monthly accounting services for the corporation 
as a certified public accountant and member of an indepen- 
dent accounting partnership. The services were of a pre- 
scribed nature and were far more circumscribed than the 
broader consultant and advisory services rendered by the 
taxpayer in the revenue ruling. There was no employment 
contract involved here so that the relationship between [the 
corporation] and the accounting firm could have been termi- 
nated at any time. Moreover, we do not have here a father 
who is attempting to transfer his business to his son and 
continue to retain control of its operation. Rather, we have a 
situation where a son has established a successfit1 business 
with the financial cooperation of his father, and the father is 
in a position to provide services to the corporation in an inde- 
pendent capacity afier his stock ownership and interest there- 
in have been severed.58 
52. Id. at 560. 
53. 1970-1 C.B. 66. 
54. Lennard, 61 T.C. at 560. 
55. Rev. Rul. 70-104, 1970-1 C.B. 66. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Lennard, 61 T.C. at 560-61. 
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Citing Lewis, the Tax Court reasoned that Congress did 
not intend to include an independent contractor with no finan- 
cial stake in the corporation as one possessing an interest in 
the corporation for purposes of the attribution waiver rules?' 
According to the Tax Court, in enacting 5 302(c)(2), Congress 
was primarily concerned with redemption transactions in which 
the redeemed shareholder retained a financial stake in the 
corporation or continued to control and benefit from the 
corporation's operations following the redemption. The Tax 
Court concluded that: 
It is apparent that by the use of the word "interest" [in 
5 302(c)(Z)(A)(i)], Congress had in mind a corporate in- 
volvement greater than that attributable to a third party 
providing goods or services to the corporation. In fad, the 
statute specifically excludes creditor interests from those 
prohibited by the attribution waiver rules contained in section 
302(c),6O 
The Tax Court found that the services performed by the 
taxpayer were no more substantial than those that might have 
been performed by any ac~ountant.~' The taxpayer had no in- 
fluence over the operations of the corporation and the fees 
received by the taxpayer did not amount to a financial stake in 
the corporation.62 The court therefore characterized the 
taxpayer's interest in the corporation as no greater than a 
creditor's interest.63 
Other Tax Court cases have similarly dealt with a re- 
deemed shareholder's continuing interest in the redeeming 
corporation. In these cases, the taxpayer's continuing status as 
an employee, rather than an independent contractor, has gen- 
erally been the critical fact that has caused the court to apply 
the family attribution rules and characterize the redemption 
transaction as a dividend.64 However, two circuit court cases 
have also dealt with the issue presented in Lennard, with 
mixed results. 
59. Id. at 561. 
60. Id. at 561-62. 
61. Id. at 562. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. See, e.g., Seda v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 484, 488 (1984); Cerone v. 
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1, 33 (1986). 
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In Chertkof v. Commi~sioner,6~ the taxpayer and his fa- 
ther owned all the stock in a corporation (E & T Realty Compa- 
ny) which constructed, owned, and leased a shopping center? 
The taxpayer's one-third interest in the corporation was re- 
deemed in exchange for a one-third interest in the shopping 
center.67 Less than one year after the redemption the corpora- 
tion entered into a management agreement with the taxpayer 
and a new management corporation (Chertkof Co.) owned by 
the taxpayer.68 The agreement, which was not terminable for 
two years, gave the taxpayer's corporation the exclusive power 
to determine rents, negotiate and execute leases, and set aside 
money for repairs and insuran~e.~' The fee charged by the 
taxpayer's corporation was below customary rates for similar 
management contracts.70 
The Service challenged the taxpayer's treatment of the 
redemption transaction. The Tax Court upheld the Service's 
position that through the management agreement the taxpayer 
acquired an interest in the corporation within the meaning of 
$ 302(~)(2)(A)(ii).?' Because the Tax Court concluded that the 
taxpayer could not waive the family attribution rules, the stock 
held by the taxpayer's father was attributed to the taxpayer 
and the redemption proceeds were treated as a dividend.72 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the 
decision of the Tax The Fourth Circuit agreed with 
the Tax Court that the management contract should properly 
be treated as between the taxpayer and the redeeming corpora- 
tion: 
It is true that Chertkof Co. is a bona fide corporation. Its 
essential purpose, however, is engineering; it had never before 
managed property or engaged in the kind of commercial activ- 
ity required by the maintenance contract. Taxpayer, on the 
other hand, was experienced in commercial property manage- 
ment. It is obvious fiom the sequence of events that it was his 
65. 649 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981). 





71. Chertkof v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1113, 1126 (1979), affd, 649 F.2d 264 
(4th Cir. 1981). The Tax Court distinguished Lennard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 
554 (1974), on its facts. Chertkof, 72 T.C. at 1124. 
72. Chertkof, 72 T.C. at 1126. 
73. Chertkof v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 264, 270 (4th Cir. 1981). 
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personal expertise that was acquired by the maintenance 
contract. . . . 
. . .  
It would take a simplistic view of the intrafamily busi- 
ness dealings reflected by the record to hold other than the 
Tax Court held-that the maintenance contract was in reality 
a contract between E & T and Taxpayer." 
The Fourth Circuit did not specifically address the issue of 
whether a former shareholder has a prohibited interest per se 
when retained as an independent contractor. However, lan- 
guage in the opinion suggests that the Fourth Circuit accepts 
the Tax Court's analysis in determining whether a shareholder 
has a prohibited interest. That analysis requires a finding that 
the redeemed shareholder maintains a financial or control 
interest in the corporation: 
The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's determination 
that the Taxpayer retained stock interest after the attempted 
redemption because he did not comply with subsection (ii) 
above in that through the maintenance contract between 
Chertkof Co. and E & T, Taxpayer maintained a financial and 
control interest in E & T. It is the correctness of this holding 
that is in issue.75 
After analyzing the facts, the Fourth Circuit concluded, 
"The maintenance contract in effect gave complete control over 
E & T to Taxpayer (who.had absolute control of Chertkof Co.), 
and with it power to use E & T in many ways which could 
inure to him finan~ially."~~ In using this financial and control 
interest test, the Fourth Circuit indicated that it does not con- 
sider an independent contractor to hold a prohibited interest, 
per se. 
In Lynch v. Cornrni~sioner,~~ the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result, holding that a taxpay- 
er who provides services as an independent contractor to a 
corporation after a complete redemption of stock has an inter- 
est in the corporation prohibited by § 302(c)(2)(~)(i).~~ The 




77. 801 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1986). 
78. Id. at 1179. 
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deemed shareholder did not have an interest in the corporation, 
did not attempt to distinguish the facts involved in Lynch from 
the facts present in Lennard. Rather, the court disagreed with 
the rationale in Lennard and argued that any relationship with 
the corporation, other than a creditor relationship, is a prohib- 
ited interest under § 302(~)(2)(~)(i).~' 
The taxpayer in Lynch was the sole shareholder of a corpo- 
ration involved in the leasing of cast-in-place concrete pipe ma- 
c h i n e ~ . ~ ~  The taxpayer owned the machines individually, but 
leased them to his ~orporation.~' The taxpayer sold a small 
amount of stock to his son and shortly thereafter the corpora- 
tion redeemed his remaining stocksg2 The taxpayer's son, seek- 
ing to retain his father's expertise in the specialized machinery, 
entered into a consulting agreement on behalf of the corpora- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  The agreement between the taxpayer and the corpora- 
tion provided for payments of $500 per month for five years, 
plus reimbursement of all business related expenses.84 In re- 
turn the taxpayer agreed to render technical consulting servic- 
es as the corporation might reasonably requestsg5 In addition, 
the taxpayer was covered by the corporation's group medical in- 
surance policy and medical reimbursement plan.86 
The Tax Court found that the services provided by the 
taxpayer did not amount to a prohibited interest in the corpora- 
t i ~ n . ~ ?  After determining that the taxpayer was an indepen- 
dent contractor rather than an employee, the Tax Court ana- 
lyzed the facts and circumstances to determine whether the 
taxpayer had a financial stake in the corporation or managerial 
control after the r edem~t ion .~~  Since the consulting agreement 
was not linked to the future profitability of the corporation and 
there was no evidence that the taxpayer exerted any control 
over the corporation, the Tax Court determined that the tax- 
payer did not have an interest prohibited by § 302(c)(2)(A)(ihg9 
79. Id. at 1181. 
80. Id. at 1176-77. 






87. Lynch v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 597, 610 (1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1176 (9th 
Cir. 1986). 
88. Id. at 606. 
89. Id. at 608. 
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The Ninth Circuit rejected the Tax Court's "individualized 
determination of whether a taxpayer has retained a financial 
stake or continued to control the corporati~n."~~ Citing lan- 
guage from 5 302's legislative history, the Ninth Circuit con- 
cluded that its holdingg1 "comports with the plain language of 
5 302 and its legislative history."92 
B. The Tax Court Analysis is the Better Approach 
Despite the assertion in Lynch that the plain meaning of 
the statute and the legislative history demand that an indepen- 
dent contractor be treated as holding a prohibited interest in 
the redeeming corporation, a more careful reading of the stat- 
ute and its legislative history favor the analysis adopted by the 
Tax Court in Lennard. 
The relevant statutory language in $ 302 requires that the 
family stock attribution rules be waived if, inter alia, "immedi- 
ately after the distribution the distributee has no interest in 
the corporation (including an interest as officer, director, or 
employee), other than an interest as a  redi it or."'^ In order to 
avoid the application of the family attribution rules, the re- 
deemed shareholder cannot have an "interest" in the corpora- 
tion, other than as a creditor, following the redemption. 
One of the basic rules of statutory construction is that a 
term used in a statute is given its common meaning unless 
circumstances indicate otherwise." Black's Law Dictionary 
defines "interest" as "[tlhe most general term that can be em- 
ployed to denote a right, claim, title, or legal share in some- 
thing. . . . More particularly it means a right to have the ad- 
vantage accruing fkom anything; any right in the nature of 
property, but less than title."95 Generally, an independent con- 
tractor cannot be said to have a right, claim, title, or legal 
share in a corporation to which he or she provides services, 
other than as a creditor for services already performed. 
Notwithstanding the argument in Lynch that inquiring 
into the facts and circumstances surrounding a consulting 
agreement creates uncertainty in the application of $ 302, 
90. Lynch v. Commissioner, 801 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1986). 
91. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78. 
92. Lynch, 801 F.2d at 1182. 
93. I.R.C. 9 302(c)(2)(A)(i). 
94. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). 
95. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 729 (5th ed. 1979). 
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without examining the facts and circumstances it is impossible 
to determine whether a redeemed shareholder has an interest 
in the corporation. One must wonder why, if it is appropriate to 
look at  the facts and circumstances to determine whether a 
redeemed shareholder is a creditor or an owner:6 it is not ap- 
propriate to examine the facts and circumstances to determine 
whether a shareholder, through a consulting agreement with 
the corporation, has an interest in the corporation. Whether a 
former shareholder is a creditor or an interest holder depends 
on the definition of those terms under 5 302(c)(2)(A)(i), and an 
examination of the facts is necessary to reach a conclusion. The 
Ninth Circuit would have us believe that Congress intended to 
make no distinction, in determining the tax treatment of a 
redemption transaction, between a redeemed shareholder who 
enters into a contract to remove snow fkom the company park- 
ing lot and a redeemed shareholder who enters into a contract 
giving the redeemed shareholder complete authority to manage 
the corporation's business activities. Interpreting the statute to 
include any independent contractor as one holding an interest 
in the corporation simply does not comply with the basic rule of 
statutory construction ascribing the common meaning to terms 
used in a statute. 
According to the Ninth Circuit, "[tlhe parenthetical lan- 
guage in section 302(c)(Z)(A)(i) merely provides a subset of 
prohibited interests from the universe of such interests, and in 
no way limits us from finding that an independent contractor 
retains a prohibited intere~t."~' The Ninth Circuit is correct. 
However, the fact that Congress decided to make clear that an 
officer, director, or employee could be treated as holding an 
interest in the corporation does not mandate that all indepen- 
dent contractors be deemed to hold an interest in the corpora- 
tion within the meaning of § 302(c)(2)(A)(i). Even though an 
officer, director, or employee may not normally be considered to 
hold a "right, claim, title or legal share" in his or her corpora- 
tion, Congress determined that because of the potential for an 
officer, director, or employee to control the corporation's opera- 
tions, the statute should make clear that one in a position to 
control the corporation has an interest in the corporation with- 
in the meaning of § 302(~)(2)(A)(i).'~ If we ascribe the common 
96. See, e.g., Lennard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 554, 562 (1974); Dunn v. 
Commissioner, 615 F.2d 578, 584-85 (2d Cir. 1980). 
97. Lynch v. Commissioner, 801 F.2d 1176, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1986). 
98. H.R. REP. NO. 1337, supra note 9, at 36, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
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meaning to the terrn "interest," it is more logical to conclude 
that by the inclusion of officers, directors, and employees Con- 
gress was attempting to make clear that taxpayers in a posi- 
tion to control the operations of the corporation are treated as 
holding an interest in the corporation. This interpretation of 
the statute is supported by the policy underlying § 302(c)(2), 
that taxpayers who, after a stock redemption transaction, con- 
tinue to control the family-owned corporation or maintain a 
financial stake in it should not obtain the benefit of sale 
treatment on the redemption." It is this underlying policy 
that requires an examination of the facts and circumstances to 
determine whether a particular consulting agreement gives a 
redeemed shareholder the ability to control the operations of 
the corporation or to benefit financially in a manner similar to 
a shareholder with an ownership interest. 
The Ninth Circuit relies on legislative history to conclude 
that examining the facts and circumstances surrounding a 
consulting agreement creates uncertainty that Congress sought 
to eliminate when it enacted 5 302.1W The court's reliance on 
the legislative history is misplaced. 
The uncertainty that concerned Congress resulted from the 
dividend equivalency test used by the courts prior to the enact- 
ment of § 302. Under the dividend equivalency test, payments 
from a corporation that are not essentially equivalent to a 
dividend are taxed as capital gains.''' The facts and circum- 
stances surrounding the transaction are examined to determine 
whether the distribution by the corporation is essentially equiv- 
alent to a dividend. The Ninth Circuit102 cited the following 
language from the House Committee Report: 
In lieu of a factual inquiry in every case, [§ 3021 is intended 
to prescribe specific conditions from which the taxpayer may 
ascertain whether a given redemption will be taxable at rates 
applicable to the sale of assets or as a distribution of property 
not in redemption of stock subject to section 301.1°3 
at 4212-13; S. REP. NO. 1622, supra note 9, at 45, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 4676. 
99. S. REP. NO. 1622, supra note 9, at 45, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
4676. Even the Ninth Circuit agrees that this is the policy underlying 302(c)(2). 
See Lynch, 801 F.2d at 1181 n.7. 
100. Lynch, 801 F.2d at 1179. 
101. Bains v. United States, 289 F.2d 644, 647 (Ct. C1. 1961). 
102. Lynch, 801 F.2d at 1179. 
103. H.R. REP. NO. 1337, supra note 9, at 35, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
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The factual inquiry referred to relates to the dividend 
equivalency test, not whether a shareholder retains an interest 
under 5 302(c)(2)(A), and the specific conditions referred to 
relate to the redemption tests found in 5 302(b)(2), (b)(3), and 
(b)(4).lo4 The legislative history of 5 302(c)(2) contains no im- 
plication that a factual inquiry into whether a shareholder 
retains an interest in the corporation is improper. The legisla- 
tive history cited by the Ninth Circuit is inapposite. 
The approach of the Tax Court, as set forth in Lewis, 
Lennard, and Lynch, and the apparent approach of the Fourth 
Circuit discussed in Chertkof support the policy underlying 
5 302(c)(2). That policy is to allow sale or exchange treatment 
on the redemption of a family-owned corporation's stock only 
when the shareholder has retained no control or financial stake 
in the corporation's affairs. The Tax Court's approach also 
comports with the plain meaning of the statute. The statute 
states that no interest, other than an interest as a creditor, can 
be retained by a shareholder seeking to waive the family stock 
attribution rule. The statute specifically includes employee, 
officer, and director as relationships that can be seen as an 
interest in the corporation. However, an independent contractor 
is not specifically mentioned and the question becomes whether 
an independent contractor has an interest in the corporation 
within the meaning of 5 302(c)(2)(A). Based on the plain mean- 
ing of the term "interest," an independent contractor would 
generally not be considered to have an interest in the corpora- 
tion, except perhaps as a creditor for services rendered. Howev- 
er, if the facts and circumstances show that the shareholder, 
through a consulting agreement, has retained control over the 
corporation or a financial stake akin to ownership, the 
shareholder's status as an independent contractor should be 
treated as an interest in the corporation under 5 302(c)(2)(A). 
at 4210. 
104. In general, under [Q 302(b)] your committee intends to incorporate into 
the bill existing law as to whether or not a reduction is essentially 
equivalent to a dividend under section 115(g)(a) of the 1939 Code, and 
in addition to provide three definite standards in order to provide cer- 
tainty in specific instances. 
S. REP. NO. 1622, supra note 9, at 233, reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4870. 
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C. Summary 
A shareholder in a family-owned corporation should care- 
fully plan for the redemption of his or her stock. Due to the 
application of the family stock attribution rules in all but com- 
plete redemption transactions, it is only when all of his or her 
stock is redeemed that the redeemed shareholder will obtain 
capital gain treatment. Younger family members may want to 
retain the redeemed shareholder's services as a consultant, 
especially when the redeemed shareholder has some technical 
expertise applicable to the corporation's business. Although the 
case law is in conflict over the issue of whether a consulting 
agreement, per se, constitutes an interest in a corporation, the 
Service's view is that any such agreement between a redeemed 
shareholder and his or her corporation is a prohibited interest 
that prevents the redeemed shareholder from waiving the fami- 
ly attribution rules. Although the Tax Court and the Fourth 
Circuit Court analyze the facts and circumstances to determine 
whether a particular consulting agreement constitutes a pro- 
hibited interest, the Ninth Circuit has adopted the view of the 
Service. The analysis adopted by the Tax Court and apparently 
the Fourth Circuit is supported by the statutory language and 
the policy underlying 5 302(c)(2). However, cautious taxpayers 
who reside outside the Fourth Circuit may decide to avoid 
postredemption consulting agreements. Other taxpayers need 
to exercise care in drafting postredemption consulting agree- 
ments. An agreement providing the redeemed shareholder with 
de facto control of the corporation's operations or a compensa- 
tion formula tied to the success of the corporation's business 
may be held to be an interest in the corporation and turn a 
valid sale into a dividend. 
A. The Problem of Subordinated Debt and the Waiver of 
Family Stock Attribution 
When a retiring shareholder enters into a redemption 
agreement with his or her closely held family corporation, the 
corporation may not have the necessary liquidity to pay the 
purchase price in cash. Perhaps the retiring shareholder may 
want to spread the gain to be recognized on the sale over a 
period of years. Consequently, the retiring shareholder may 
enter into a redemption agreement calling for an installment 
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sale of his or her stock. The installment note may be a signifi- 
cant liability on the corporation's financial statements. 
Younger family members may wish to expand the 
corporation's business and need to finance the expansion with 
corporate debt. Obtaining such financing may be difficult due 
to the large installment note payable to the retired sharehold- 
er. The retiring shareholder may be willing to subordinate his 
or her installment note in an effort to assist the corporation in 
securing additional financing. 
By subordinating the corporation's installment obligation 
to the claims of other corporate creditors, the retiring share- 
holder may unwittingly put the characterization of his or her 
stock redemption at risk since the Service views the subordina- 
tion of an installment note received in a stock redemption as 
creating a noncreditor "interest in the corporation" prohibited 
by 5 302(c)(2)(A)(i) and (ii).lo5 Having a noncreditor interest 
in the corporation, the retiring shareholder cannot take advan- 
tage of the family stock attribution waiver. Without the attri- 
bution waiver, the redemption is taxed as a dividend distribu- 
tion. lo6 
B. Analysis of Authority 
The position of the Service is expressed in Treasury Regu- 
lation 5 1.302-4(d), which states: 
For the purpose of section 302(c)(2)(A)(i), a person will be 
considered to be a creditor only if the rights of such person 
with respect to the corporation are not greater or broader in 
scope than necessary for the enforcement of his claim. Such 
claim must not in any sense be proprietary and must not be 
subordinate to the claims of general creditors. An obligation 
in the form of a debt may thus constitute a proprietary inter- 
est. For example, if under the terms of the instrument the 
corporation may discharge the principal amount of its obliga- 
tion to a person by payments, the amount or certainty of 
which are dependent upon the earnings of the corporation, 
such a person is not a creditor of the c~rporation.'~' 
105. Treas. Reg. 8 1.302-4(d) (as amended in 1978). 
106. For the treatment of the receipt of an installment obligation in a transac- 
tion characterized as a dividend distribution, see Cox v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 
1021 (1982). The value of the obligation is taxed in the year of receipt. Id. at 
1028. 
107. Treas. Reg. 8 1.3024d). 
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The Service requires that taxpayers seeking a ruling regarding 
the tax treatment of a proposed stock redemption under 
8 302(b)(3) (complete termination) represent that any note 
received by the taxpayer in connection with the redemption is 
not subordinated to the claims of general creditors.108 
The position of the Service, as expressed in the regulation 
quoted above, makes it extremely difficult for a redeeming 
shareholder to structure the installment note in a way that 
would facilitate a corporation obtaining outside financing with- 
out raising the ire of the Service. Fortunately, case law is not 
as inflexible as the Service in determining whether a redeemed 
shareholder holds an interest only as a creditor under 
§ 302(c)(2)(A). 
In Lennard v. Commis~ioner,'~~ the Tax Court addressed 
the issue of whether the taxpayer, after the redemption of all 
his stock, retained a prohibited interest in the corporation 
because the note issued to him in exchange for his stock was 
subordinated to the corporation's other debts. The Tax Court 
found that mere subordination did not make the taxpayer's 
installment note a prohibited interest within the meaning of 
9 302(c)(z)(~)(i). 'lo 
According to the Tax Court, the Service's prohibition 
against subordination arises only when other factors indicate 
that a debt instrument may, in substance, constitute a propri- 
etary interest.'" Rather than question the validity of Trea- 
sury Regulation 9 1.302-4(d), the Tax Court chose to interpret 
the regulation as requiring more than debt subordination be- 
fore a note will be treated as a prohibited interest under 
§ 302(c)(2)(A).'12 The Tax Court concluded that the other 
facts and circumstances in Lennard were indicative of a credi- 
tor interest so that the subordination of the note did not cause 
the taxpayer's interest in the corporation to be anything other 
than a creditor's interest.l13 
108. Rev. Proc. 86-18, 1986-1 C.B. 551, § 5.02. 
109. 61 T.C. 554 (1974). 
110. Id. at 563. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. The Tax Court's interpretation of Treasury Regulation 8 1.302-4(d) is 
peculiar when one considers that in Lennard the Service was litigating a case in 
which the installment note had no indicia of ownership other than subordination. 
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In Dunn v. Comrni~sioner,~~~ which also addressed the 
subordination scenario, the taxpayer entered into a stock re- 
demption agreement with her closely held family corporation. 
The agreement provided that a portion of the purchase price 
would be paid in installments. The corporation operated a 
Chevrolet dealership and the terms of the franchise agreement 
with General Motors required the corporation to "maintain a 
certain 'Owned Net Working Capital' in order to retain the 
dealership."l15 The installment sale agreement between the 
taxpayer and the corporation provided that if the making of an 
installment payment would cause the corporation to be in viola- 
tion of the "owned net working capital" requirement and would 
prevent the corporation from retaining 50% of its net after tax 
profits, then the payment would be postponed until the pay- 
ment would not result in a violation of the franchise require- 
ment.l16 
The Service argued that the taxpayer held an interest in 
the corporation other than as a creditor due to the provision in 
the installment agreement providing for postponement of pay- 
ments, and cited its regulation defining a creditor interest in 
the context of 5 302(c)(2)(A) in support of its position.l17 Thus, 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming a decision of the 
Tax Court,l18 held that the installment sale agreement treat- 
ed only a creditor interest, despite the payment restriction.llg 
The Second Circuit found Treasury Regulation 5 1.302-4(d) to 
be concerned with the redeeming shareholder's status as a 
holder of a proprietary interest in the ~orporation.'~~ The 
Treasury Regulation prohibits a redeeming shareholder from 
retaining rights broader or greater than those of a creditor 
(e.g., voting rights or rights to convert his or her claim into 
stock).121 The Treasury Regulation also prohibits a sharehold- 
er from retaining a proprietary interest by structuring the debt 
to resemble an equity interest.122 According to the Second 
615 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1980). 
Id. at 580. 
Id. 
Id. at 582. 
Dunn v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 715 (1978), affd, 615 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 
Dunn v. Commissioner, 615 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1980) 
Id. at 582. 
Treas. Reg. 3 1.302-4(d). 
Id. 
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Circuit, the prohibition in the regulation against subordinating 
the redeeming shareholder's installment payment to the claims 
of general creditors is an attempt to address the equity aspect 
of a proprietary interest, not the nature of a subordinated in- 
teres t . 123 
In addition to claiming that the taxpayer had a noncreditor 
interest in the corporation, the Service argued that the terms of 
the taxpayer's redemption agreement restricting the timing of 
the corporation's payments amounted to debt subordina- 
t i ~ n . ' ~ ~  In response, the Second Circuit did not hold, as the 
Tax Court concluded in Lennard, that mere subordination fails 
to convert an otherwise valid debt into an equity interest under 
5 302(~)(2)(A).'~~ Rather, the Court determined that the terms 
of the redemption agreement did not amount to debt subordina- 
tion: 
Nothing in the agreement affects the rank of the taxpayer's 
claim as against general creditors, and there is nothing in the 
Agreement that, if [the corporation] had been put into liqui- 
dation, would have given any creditor a basis for arguing that 
he should be paid before the taxpayer was paid.126 
Finally, the Service argued that the taxpayer retained a 
prohibited interest since, under Treasury Regulation 8 1.302- 
4(d), a redeemed shareholder is not considered merely a credi- 
tor if "under the terms of the instrument the corporation may 
discharge the principal amount of its obligation [to the re- 
deemed shareholder] by payments, 'the amount or certainty of 
which are dependent upon the earnings of the corpora- 
t i ~ n . ' " ' ~ ~  The Court found that the restriction regarding pay- 
ments on the installment note affected only the timing of the 
payment and not the amount or certainty of payment so that 
the regulation was inapplicable to the facts: 
The regulation, then, does not support the 
Commissioner's position, for the instrument under review 
does not exhibit a single one of the characteristics given sig- 
nificance by the regulation. What is more important, the obli- 
gation here, to the extent that it differs from the classic debt 
123. Dunn, 615 F.2d at 582. 
124. Id. 
125. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
126. Dunn, 615 F.2d at 582-83. 
127. Id. at 583. 
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of fixed amount and inexorable due date, does not differ in 
the direction of being a proprietary or equity type of interest, 
but differs simply in being unmistakably debt, but of a seem- 
ingly somewhat inferior quality because of the postponement 
clause. 12'
The Second Circuit, having determined that the regulation 
cited by the Service was inapplicable to the facts of the case, 
turned its attention to the question of how to determine if a 
instrument is debt or equity. Although dicta, language in Dunn 
suggests that the Second Circuit agrees with the Tax Court 
that mere subordination of a debt does not create an interest 
other than the interest as a creditor.12' 
In Duerr v. Commi~sioner,'~~ the taxpayer received bonds 
in a redemption transaction treated by the taxpayer as a corn- 
plete termination of interest under § 302(b)(3). Interest on the 
bonds received was payable at a fixed rate, but payable out of 
income only.13' No subrogation clause was included in the 
sales agreement. The Tax Court observed that the terms of 
payment on the bonds were, in substance, no different than the 
terms of the preferred stock redeemed in the t ran~act i0n. l~~ 
The Tax Court found the bonds to be a prohibited interest, 
resulting in dividend treatment on the amount received by the 
taxpayer and originally treated as sales proceeds from the 
redemption transaction. '33 
A close reading of Lennard and Dunn reveals that neither 
case actually rejects the Service's apparent position that a 
redeeming shareholder who subordinates his or her installment 
note to the claims of creditors has retained a prohibited inter- 
est under § 302(c)(2)(A). In Lennard, the Tax Court interpreted 
Treasury Regulation 5 1.302-4(d) as requiring more than mere 
subordination before a debt will be treated as a prohibited 
interest.134 In Dunn, the Second Circuit avoided confronting 
the issue of whether mere subordination creates a prohibited 
interest by finding that the terms of the redemption agreement 
did not amount to debt s~bordination.'~~ However, the discus- 
Id. 
See id. at  584. 
30 T.C. 944 (1958). 
Id. at  946. 
Id. at  945. 
Id. at  948. 
See supra text accompanying note 110. 
See supra text accompanying note 124. 
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sion in each case regarding what constitutes debt and what 
constitutes equity indicates that mere subordination of an in- 
stallment note received in the complete redemption of a 
shareholder's stock will not cause the redeemed shareholder to 
be treated as retaining a prohibited interest.136 
Lennard and Dunn appear to adopt, for purposes of 
9 302(c)(2)(A), the analysis underlying 9 385 of the Code.137 
Section 385 requires an examination of several factors to deter- 
mine if an instrument is debt or equity.138 This analysis is 
consistent with the purpose underlying 5 302(c)(2) to allow sale 
treatment to a bona fide redemption of stock from a sharehold- 
er of family-owned corporation where the shareholder has not 
retained the incidents of shareholder status, namely, a propri- 
etary interest in the corporation or the ability to control the 
corporation's affairs. This approach to analyzing debt in the 
context of redemption transactions involving family-owned 
corporations is likewise reflected in Duerr, in which the pay- 
ment to the shareholder, dependent on corporate earnings, was 
akin to a proprietary interest. 
C. Summary 
A shareholder who receives an installment obligation and 
agrees to subordinate the obligation to the claims of general 
creditors risks a challenge fkom the Service. Although the cases 
dealing with this issue have not specifically invalidated the 
regulation relied on by the Service, they do indicate that mere 
subordination of an installment note will not cause an other- 
wise valid stock redemption to be recast as a dividend distribu- 
tion. Intrepid shareholders may choose to risk litigation with 
the Service in an effort to assist the family-owned corporation 
in obtaining outside financing. This may be a better alternative 
than personally guaranteeing corporate debt. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Achieving capital gain treatment is the tax objective of a 
shareholder planning the redemption of stock by his or her 
family-owned corporation. However, a shareholder may have 
nontax objectives as well, such as continuing to provide impor- 
136. Dunn, 615 F.2d at 584; Lennard, 61 T.C. at 563. 
137. I.R.C. 5 385 (1988). 
138. Id. 5 38501). 
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tant services to the corporation after the redemption, or accom- 
modating the corporation's desire to obtain additional financ- 
ing. Due to the possible application of the family stock attribu- 
tion rules and consequent dividend treatment, taxpayers need 
to recognize the potential pitfalls on the path to obtaining capi- 
tal gain treatment. 
A redeeming shareholder needs to address the problem 
presented when a trust of which the shareholder is a beneficia- 
ry owns stock in the corporation, even if the shareholder's in- 
terest in the trust is remote and contingent. Unless the trust 
allows for the distribution of the stock to trust beneficiaries the 
redeeming shareholder may be put to a hard choice among 
remaining a shareholder, paying tax at ordinary income rates 
on the amount distributed by the corporation in exchange for 
the shareholder's stock, and renouncing his or her interest in 
the trust in order to obtain capital gain treatment. 
Providing postredemption consulting services to the re- 
deeming corporation can create problems for a redeeming 
shareholder as well. The Service and the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals hold that any agreement to provide postredemption 
consulting services creates a prohibited interest that causes a 
redemption to be treated as a dividend. The Tax Court holds 
that not all postredemption services taint an otherwise valid 
sale transaction. Only when the terms of the consulting agree- 
ment give the former shareholder a financial stake in the cor- 
poration or control over its operations will the Tax Court recast 
a redemption as a dividend distribution. The Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals appears to agree with the Tax Court. Share- 
holders who provide postredemption services to the family- 
owned corporation risk litigation. If the nature of their consult- 
ing agreement gives the shareholder control over the 
corporation's affairs or if the payments to be made to the share- 
holder are tied to the success of the corporation, the redemp- 
tion will be treated as a dividend distribution. 
Finally, subordinating an installment note received by the 
retiring shareholder may cause the redemption to be chal- 
lenged by the Service. Although case law appears to reject the 
Service's position that mere subordination of an installment 
note to the claims of general creditors is fatal to sale treat- 
ment, taxpayers need to be cautious in drafting the subordina- 
tion agreement to avoid other indicia of equity ownership that 
might suggest that the shareholder has more than a creditor's 
interest in the redeeming corporation. 
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A family-owned corporation presents unique planning prob- 
lems for the redeeming shareholder. Avoiding the obstacles 
discussed above may be difficult, but taxpayers need to recog- 
nize that failing to adequately plan the redemption transaction 
can be financially devastating. A shareholder who thought he 
or she completed a valid stock redemption may discover that 
the transaction will be taxed as a dividend. 
